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Volume I: Assessment Report
1.0 Authorization and Notification
The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) was requested to support the Explosion/Blast
Dynamics for Constellation Launch Vehicles Assessment Review. This assessment was
approved out-of-board on June 4, 2007 by Mr. Ralph Roe, NESC Director. This assessment was
led by Mr. Mel Baer, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) Senior Scientist, and co-led by Mr.
Clint Cragg, NESC Principal Engineer. The Assessment Plan was approved by the NESC
Review Board (NRB) on January 30, 2008. The key stakeholders for this assessment
methodology are Ray Silvestri and Leo Langston of Johnson Space Center (JSC).
The NESC team was tasked to perform an independent review of data and provide consultation
on the following:
The team was asked to provide recommendations for quantitative characterization of a
potential blast environment resulting from an inadvertent release of liquid fuel and
oxidant based on the current Ares-1 configuration and feasible failure causes (both
supplied by NASA).
2. The team was also asked to describe best practices procedures to enable
characterization of most likely explosion environments of the Ares-1 Crew Launch
Vehicle.
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3.0 List of Team Members
Name Position/TDT Affiliation Center/Contractor
Core Team
Mel Baer Team Lead Sandia National Laboratories
Dave Crawford Shock Physics Code Development Sandia National Laboratories
Charles Hickox Fluid Flow Analysis Sandia National Laboratories
Marlin Kipp Shock Physics Analysis Sandia National Laboratories
Gene Hertel General Technical Manager Sandia National Laboratories
Hal Morgan Program Manager Sandia National Laboratories
Arthur Ratzel Director, Engineering Sciences Sandia National Laboratories
Leo Langston Stakeholder JSC
Ray Silvestri Stakeholder JSC
Consultants
Clint Cragg NESC Principal Engineer LaRC
Charles Schafer NESC Chief Engineer MSFC
Support
Tina Dunn Project Coordinator ATK, LaRC
Laura Leybold MTSO Program Analyst LaRC
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4.0 Executive Summary
An assessment methodology is developed to guide quantitative predictions of adverse physical
environments and the subsequent effects on the Ares-1 crew launch vehicle associated with the
loss of containment of cryogenic liquid propellants from the upper stage during ascent.
Development of the methodology is led by a team at SNL with guidance and support from a
number of NASA personnel. The methodology is based on the current Ares-1 design and feasible
accident scenarios. These scenarios address containment failure from debris impact or structural
response to pressure or blast loading from an external source. Once containment is breached, the
envisioned assessment methodology includes predictions for the sequence of physical processes
stemming from cryogenic tank failure. The investigative techniques, analysis paths, and
numerical simulations that comprise the proposed methodology are summarized and appropriate
simulation software is identified.
5.0 Assessment Plan
The assessment methodology was developed by a team from SNL with guidance and support
from personnel at Langley Research Center (LaRC), Johnson Space Center (JSC), and Marshall
Space Flight Center (MSFC). Participants in the assessment are listed in the team table in Section
3.0. It should be emphasized that a general assessment methodology was developed and is not
based on particular accident scenarios. It is anticipated that future analyses of specific accidents
will follow the approach established by this methodology.
This assessment methodology was based on:
Review of NASA documents which describe the Ares-1 Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV);
2. Review of prior experimental programs which consider the potential for explosions
resulting from the mixing of liquid oxygen (1,02) and liquid hydrogen (LH2);
3. Identification of generic accident scenarios to provide a focus for the development;
4. Identification of the possible sequence of events corresponding to generic accident
scenarios;
Identification of the types of analyses required to predict the environments and resulting
effects of hypothesized accidents;
6. Identification of computational software suitable for the required simulations; and
Requirements for the validation of predictions. It was not possible to develop a highly
specific assessment methodology because precise accident scenarios details were not
specified.
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To compensate for this lack of information, generic accident scenarios were identified which
exhibit possible adverse effects on the Ares-1 CLV. It is believed that these scenarios cover a
range of possible failure mechanisms and sequences of events that could produce explosion
hazards.
6.0 Description of the Problem and Proposed Solutions
6.1 Description of Problem
An assessment methodology is established for the quantitative prediction of physical
environments and subsequent vehicle interactions associated with a potential blast environment
resulting from an inadvertent release of liquid fuel and oxidant from the US of the Ares-1 CLV
during ascent. This work is pursued under an agreement between SNL and the NESC. The
methodology is based on the current Ares-1 configuration and proposed feasible accident
scenarios [ref I]. Feasible accident scenarios are to be defined by NASA. Hence, the
development of an assessment methodology must be based on assumed, generic accident
scenarios. The methodology described herein is intended to increase confidence in the
assumptions, methods, and analyses that could be conducted to make key technical
recommendations and decisions affecting vehicle design, crew survival, and ascent abort
procedures relating to the survival from a blast environment. This includes defining best practice
procedures for the characterization of explosion environments.
For purposes of Launch Abort System (LAS) design for the Ares-1 system, there is a need to
understand and characterize the potential explosion environment produced by a release of liquid
propellant from the US. It is important to understand the environments associated with such a
catastrophic failure in terms of the blast, debris, and thermal characteristics at the Crew Module
(CM) during separation from the failing vehicle as part of the Launch Abort Vehicle. Both near-
field and far-field initial blast properties must be considered. Key features of appropriate
methodologies include defining the key physics that need to be modeled, determining
appropriate inputs to these models, identifying appropriate modeling tools for simulation and
defining the expected model outputs for characterizing the blast and transport of material and
energy in relation to the interaction with the CM (or other parts of the vehicle).
In discussing the potentially explosive environment, the terms explosion, detonation, and
deflagration will be used and brief definitions of these terms are given in Section 12. More
detailed definitions of these terms can be found in the book [ref. 2], by Kuo (1977). The focus of
any methodology for the prediction of a propellant explosion necessarily centers on the release of
hydrogen from the storage tank in the US and the subsequent mixing and reaction with oxygen
causing rapid energy release. An initial analysis methodology was outlined and summarized in a
PowerPoint presentation dated January 24, 2008. The associated slides are reproduced in
Appendix A. This presentation forms the basis for the subsequent discussion of the developed
methodology.
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6.2 Overview of Methodology
As stated above, the methodology to be described is based on the inadvertent release of
propellants and the possible consequences associated with such a release. A meaningful
prediction of a potential explosion event requires fundamentally that the entire sequence of
processes associated with cryogenic tank rupture, venting, and mixing of the hydrogen with
oxygen or ambient air be described in detail. A series of four steps is envisioned as a path to
determining the consequences of a loss of containment of propellants that can occur either
externally or internally to the stage structure:
Define the accident scenarios (NASA responsibility);
2. Determine the initial conditions for a potential blast environment;
3. Predict the pressure, impulse, thermal, and debris sources; and
4. Determine the environment at the crew exploration vehicle (CEV).
Each of these steps is described in the subsequent sections. Following identification of the
fundamental steps, a summary of the general types of simulation software required for the
proposed predictions is discussed and specific existing computational software packages are
identified that are potentially suitable for the required simulations.
6.2.1 Accident Scenarios
Credible accidents that could result in the loss of containment of propellants include:
Debris from a solid rocket booster explosion breaching an exterior propellant tank wall;
2. Debris lost from structures forward of the stage breaching an exterior propellant tank
wall;
3. Energy release sufficient to cause catastrophic rupture of propellant tanks; and
4. Pressure imbalance between hydrogen and oxygen tanks leading to failure of the common
bulkhead which separates the propellants.
Since a specific accident scenario has not been identified, the proposed methodology is
illustrated with reference to a sequence of events. Once specific accident scenarios have been
identified, it is necessary to identify both the relevant physical processes to be addressed and
specific computational software that can be used to provide useful simulations.
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6.2.2 Initial Conditions for the Blast Environment
Initial conditions leading to a potential blast environment are derived from the details of the
accident scenarios, and include, but are not limited to:
Location on the US tanks where breach of the cryogenic tanks occurs,
2.	 Modes of failure of the tank(s) (e.g. holes, cracks or tears of material associated with
rupture of the tanks)
Availability of oxygen (e.g., ambient atmosphere and/or subsequent failure of liquid
oxidant tank);
4. Tank pressures and temperatures of the hydrogen, oxygen and/or ambient air determining
the thennodynamic states associated with the mixing and stoichiometry of a potential
combustion event;
Confinement or the degree of intimate contact of the hydrogen-oxygen mixture
determining whether a deflagration can evolve into a detonation; and
6. Trajectory data including available fuel volume, relative vehicle velocity and ambient air
free-field conditions.
6.2.3 Pressure, Impulse, Thermal, and Debris Source Terms
The pressure, impulse, thermal and debris environments, at selected altitudes, can be estimated
upon specifying the above initial conditions. The existing White Sands Test Facility (WSTF)
experimental data [ref. 3] (Bunker-Farrah, R, et al., 2002) provides much insight into propellant
explosion behavior and measurements from these tests can provide guidance in estimating the
combustion/energy release rates. However, to supplement this historical database, additional
hydrogen/oxygen experiments may be needed to reflect conditions that are more relevant to
expected accident conditions, i.e. rupture of a single compartment of the tank configuration that
potentially causes subsequent failure of the auxiliary tank; failure of a common bulkhead; and/or
dynamic environment effects.
The essential ingredients of a potential explosion require that hydrogen and oxygen be brought
together as either gases or liquids. Since these constituents are originally separated and stored as
liquids, the turbulent mixing of these reactants must be modeled. Subsequently, the ignition of
the mixture must then be considered. Based on prior work from WSTF, self ignition is likely to
occur (without any external source) when the liquids first come in contact. Under conditions of
weak confinement, the initial mixing and combustion behavior produces rapid gas formation and
energy release that likely drives the propellants apart and impedes (rather than enhances) gross
mixing of the non-premixed reactants. Typically, these reactive processes of liquid propellants
produce rapid deflagrations rather than detonations and the blast waves from these explosions are
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characterized by much lower source pressures and impulse than otherwise realized by high
explosives of equivalent energy release. Hence, it is important to use an appropriate model for
turbulent combustion with timescales that partition the energy release supporting blast vs. waste
heat (volumetric combustion behavior) and reflects limited combustion behavior. For example, a
volumetric energy source can be used in shock physics analysis to represent the turbulent
combustion environment that induce blast effects due to distributed energy release [ref 4] (Ritzel,
D.V. and Matthews, K., 1997). The fireball characteristics can be estimated using traditional
existing correlations to determine the thermal environment [ref 5] (Baker, et al., 1983). The rate
of energy release during the reaction determines the pressure and the impulse at the CEV, as well
as the characteristics of the ejected debris (i.e. a non-shock event should produce relatively large
fragments moving at relatively low velocities).
6.2.4 Environment at the CEV
The environment at the CEV is determined from analyses that define near- and far-field effects.
The nature of the explosion event covers a broad range of time scales and the various aspects of
relevant physics are weakly coupled. Hence, structural failure of the tanks, venting, mixing of the
reactants, combustion, blast and structural response of the CEV can be modeled sequentially,
using the output from one event as initial conditions for the next. A fully coupled fluid/structural
analysis is likely not required and one-way coupling should be adequate in these assessments.
The near-field effects include blast over-pressure/impulse, heat transfer and debris environment
at the CEV while still attached to the US. The consequences of debris dispersal are determined
by mass/velocity characteristics of the debris ejected from the US that intersects the CEV. The
far-field effects include defining blast over-pressure/impulse, heat transfer, and debris
environments at the CEV. In addition, the thennal and debris insults to the parachutes during an
abort should be considered. Launch abort timing relative to an explosion is critical in order to
determine the CEV environment.
6.2.5 Simulation Software
A broad spectrum of numerical analysis tools is required to perform the analyses described. A
suggested list of computational codes is included in Table 6.2-1, where all software packages are
available at SNL and an asterisk indicates SNL-developed software. It is anticipated that both
commercially available and laboratory-developed software (SNL or elsewhere) will be required
to perform the suite of simulations required to meet the requirements of the developed
methodology in a timely manner.
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Table 6.2-1. Summary of Computational Analvsis Codes
Code Analysis Capabilities
FLOV4'3D; FLUENT Computational fluid dynamics / turbulent flow / mixing
reaction
CHEETAH Define high pressure product EOS and thermo-chemistry
CTH Y Shock physics, blast environment, debris formation
PRESTO; JAS3D*; ABAQUS Structural mechanics
GALORE'`, COYOTE* Thermal analysis
PREMO* Aerodynamics
Computational fluid dynamics (CFD) (e.g. FLOW313, FLUENT) codes are required to assess the
mixing and reaction of the released hydrogen with on-board oxygen and/or ambient air. The
cryogenic fluids, hydrogen and oxygen, must change to mixed vapor phases in order to promptly
react and this transformation likely occurs as a dense mixture. A chemical equilibrium code (e.g.
CHEETAH) with non-ideal gas capability is needed to define the equation of state, thermo-
chemistry, and energy release capabilities of the potentially dense state reactant mixture. The
actual energy release is required in shock physics analysis codes (e.g. CTH) to detennine blast
environment (ullage pressure and impulse histories) and thermal field of the fireball. The
consequent debris characterization and impact dynamics can also be estimated with the shock
physics code. Structural, thermal, and aerodynamics codes (e.g. PRESTO, CALORE, PREMO,
respectively) are also required to fully address the response to the blast environment.
The required fidelity of simulations (i.e., level of detail in the models and physics required to
assure that all the significant factors/geometry are included) must be deternzined. This
investigation should include benchmark models and/or analyses of example past accidents.
There is a wealth of hydrogen explosion experimental data available; however, not all of it may
be relevant to a tank failure scenario. To gain some additional insight, the WSTF LH2/LO2 data
could be reanalyzed whereby a distributed energy release is modeled rather than treated as a
point explosive source (i.e., volume explosion vs. high explosive (HE) detonation). Additional
experiments could be conducted to gain an understanding of this blast environment whereby
different breakup conditions of the propellant tanks are postulated that are more representative of
actual mixing conditions.
In addition to the expertise at SNL, consultation with outside expertise is likely to prove fruitful.
For example, Professor J. E. Shepherd (Caltech) is an internationally recognized expert in
hydrogen explosion/ blast characterization and has assisted SNL in several other prior studies of
volumetric explosion behavior.
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6.2.6 Summary
The sequence of tasks to determine the consequences of propellant release (internal and/or
external to the stage structure) is summarized as follows:
Define/assess the potential credible accidents that would release propellants and cause a
subsequent explosion;
2. Evaluate/interpret existing experimental data;
3. Determine the initial conditions for propellant release and/or mixing derived from details
of the accident scenarios;
4. Identify the wide spectrum of computational tools required for the analyses;
Determine the energy release and possible blast effects for the scenario(s) of interest;
6. Use the blast environment to define both the near- and far-field pressure/impulse/debris
effects; and
Assess potential accident consequences on the CEV.
6.3 Accident Scenario Considerations
In section 6.2.1 a set of possible accident scenarios is listed; however, details and data needed for
failure assessment (i.e. debris propagation from the explosion of the First Stage solid propellant
to the US) are not currently available. Hence, an alternate approach is to assume that the Second
Stage propellant tanks are breached and omit consideration of the details of accidents that may
adversely affect the tanks. Regardless of the scenario definition, the path of events leading to a
potential explosion in the US, centers on breach of the propellant tanks and on the modes of
failure that dictate how venting and mixing of the propellants subsequently occur.
One proposed accident scenario is an "explosion" of the First Stage solid rocket motor which
would create a source of debris that might impact the exterior of the US LH2 and/or LO2 fuel
tank walls. The credibility of this scenario depends on whether a debris trajectory intersects the
US. The First Stage has a slightly smaller diameter than the US, and ejected debris does not have
an unimpeded path to the exterior walls of the US. If at the time of the accident, the First Stage
has rotated off the system axis relative to the US, a path intersection possibly exists. Under
normal aligned conditions, analyses could determine if there are adequate aerodynamic forces on
upward moving debris in a relatively downward-moving airstream that would change the
trajectory of debris towards the US. In particular, there may be some mechanism whereby
reacting propellant fragments might be accelerated into the upper tank walls. In any case,
fragments would have velocity components aligned with the longitudinal direction of the tanks,
and would likely gash or crack the tank walls rather than puncture them. This failure mode could
occur in either the liquid or ullage region of a tank. Since the propellant tanks are pressurized, a
sudden loss in ullage pressure in one tank could lead to structural failure of the adjacent
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propellant tank i yza the common bulkhead. Another possible outcome of a loss of pressure is a
boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion, or BLEVE, [ref. 5] (Baker, et al., 1983). In such an
event, the sudden drop in pressure inside a propellant tank causes violent boiling of the liquid
propellant that liberates large amounts of vapor to potentially cause a secondary explosion.
If the solid rocket motor propellant detonates, the motor case and propellant fragments are
expected to be ejected at velocities >1 km/s. Debris dimensions in the vicinity of the detonation
can be estimated with a fragmentation model [ref. 6], (e.g., Grady-Kipp, 1989). This method is
more applicable in events where the energy is sufficiently high to produce many fragments than
under other situations where only a few fragments form, such as tearing conditions. If the solid
rocket motor case bursts under elevated internal pressure, the debris will be dispersed with much
lower velocities than those of a detonation and the physical size of the debris fragments would be
expected to be much greater than those produced by a detonation.
In either a detonation or lower energetic "explosion" event, there will be shock waves
transmitted to the US that could potentially cause an imbalance of pressure in the propellant
tanks, and possible failure of the common bulkhead. This scenario would require a fairly detailed
model of the intervening structure and components coupling the shock from the explosion to the
US. Clearly, the details of the accident scenario have a major influence in determining the
propagation path of failure mechanisms leading to the onset of a potential explosion of the liquid
propellants.
7.0 Proposed Analyses
The following discussion describes analyses proposed to gain insight into accident scenarios in
which either or both US tank(s) is/are perforated by debris fragment(s) originating from the First
Stage or experience structural failure(s) caused by blast loading. The source of fragments and
subsequent impacts are not considered in this discussion. The accident could occur at any time
during the First Stage burn, so the US tanks are assumed to be fully loaded, with nominal ullage
volumes and pressures. The oxygen tank is located aft of the hydrogen tank and separation of the
tanks is maintained by a common bulkhead. There are five tank wall perforation scenarios, as
illustrated in Figure 7.0-1, for which analysis paths should be pursued:
Perforation of the oxygen tank in the fluid region;
2. Perforation of the oxygen tank in the ullage region;
Perforation of the hydrogen tank in the fluid region;
4. Perforation of the hydrogen tank in the ullage region, and
Structural response to blast loading. Each of these scenarios is considered in turn.
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Following the discussion of the individual scenarios, some brief considerations are considered
that relate to the debris source and debris interaction with the propellant tanks.
Venting of ullage
gases in LH2 tank &
mixing with air
Release of LH2 &
external inixing with
atmospheric air ai or	 LH2
Lot upon subsequent 	 t^{—
failure of L02 tanks
Common bulkhead
failure leading to
mixuig of L02 in LH
or LH2 in Lot
Venting of ullage
gases ui LC X2 tank	 L02)
tMik-
Release of L02	 ,w'._
Figure 7.0-1. Possible Failure Locations in the US Propellant Tanks
7.1 Perforation of the Oxygen Tank in the Liquid Region
Perforation of the exterior oxygen tank wall in the fluid region could result in loss of liquid at a
rate that depends on the internal fluid pressure and the size of the penetration opening(s).
Structural analysis of the region surrounding these openings is necessary to determine whether
there is sufficient pressure difference to enhance venting due to additional structural failure (e.g.
tearing). The flow of liquid oxygen into the airstream is not expected to lead immediately to an
explosion since there is no fuel present. However, the loss of oxygen will increase the ullage
volume, and if the ullage pressure cannot be maintained, rapid boiling of the oxygen could
produce an imbalance of pressure across the common bulkhead. Structural analyses,
complementing design modeling, are required to determine the consequences of this imbalance,
and whether failure of the common bulkhead occurs. If the common bulkhead fails, a flow of
hydrogen aft into the oxygen tank can occur, accompanied by boiling of the hydrogen and
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intense turbulent mixing. This would potentially lead to formation of a highly reactive mixture. If
auto-ignition occurs, rapid combustion and energy release will likely lead to complete tank wall
failure. The time to failure depends on the initial size of the vent area and ullage pressure.
7.2 Perforation of the Oxygen Tank in the Ullage Region
Perforation of the exterior tank wall in the ullage region of the oxygen tank will result in venting
of the ullage gas (helium and oxygen) into the airstream. If venting causes a rapid pressure loss,
the oxygen could boil in this region and also vent the ullage gases. As in Section 7. 1, the vented
oxygen in the absence of hydrogen does not pose an explosion hazard, however, the resulting
pressure imbalance across the common bulkhead must be analyzed to determine whether it fails
and how much oxygen remains prior to the failure. Upon common bulkhead failure, the mixing
of hydrogen with the remaining oxygen could form a combustible mixture.
7.3 Perforation of the Hydrogen Tank in the Fluid Region
Perforation of the exterior tank wall in the region of the liquid hydrogen fuel could result in flow
of the hydrogen into the airstream, and rapid vaporization. A hydrogen-air mixture is
combustible; however, the plume of vapor is likely to be fuel rich and would require an ignition
source rather than being auto-catalytic. Hence, it is unclear when burning occurs and where the
reacting plume(s) impinge on the aft structures. Failure of the ullage pressure would also result in
boiling of the hydrogen into the ullage region that could cause a pressure imbalance across the
common bulkhead. For this condition, the ullage gas in the oxygen tank is at higher pressure than
the hydrogen, and it is assumed that ullage and oxygen will be forced into the liquid hydrogen
should that failure of the common bulkhead occurs. The higher temperature of the oxygen causes
the hydrogen to boil with intense turbulent mixing to form a combustible mixture.
7.4 Perforation of the Hydrogen Tank in the Ullage Region
Perforation of the exterior tank wall in the ullage region of the hydrogen tank could result in the
venting of ullage gas into the airstream. If the vent rate is high, the loss in pressure could result
in hydrogen boiling, and venting of the ullage gases. Ignition of this mixture could be possible,
with potential of thermal damage to the exterior of the US, and possibly to the First Stage. If a
pressure imbalance should occur, the scenario becomes similar to that of Section 7.3.
7.5 Structural Response to Blast Loading
Pressure impulse loading of the propellant tanks can possibly induce a structural response that
results in failure of the internal common bulkhead or an external breach of either or both tanks.
The consequences of an internal common bulkhead failure are discussed in Section 7.1 and the
consequences of external breaches are considered in Sections 7.1-4. Detailed structural analyses
are required to predict the responses to pressure loadings
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7.6 Comments on Debris Interaction with Tanks and Energy Release
In the scenario where the source of debris is from the First Stage, the angle at which the fragment
must engage the US exterior wall is necessarily shallow, and damage area is more likely to be a
gash rather than a simple clean entry that a projectile would inflict. Perforation is expected to
lead eventually to rupture of the external tank wall and/or the common bulkhead, but this failure
depends on pressure loss rates. Knowledge of design load thresholds for the common bulkhead is
particularly important for consequences analyses if pressure imbalance develops across the
common bulkhead.
For a specified insult to a tank wall, a combination of fluid and structural code analyses are
required to follow the sequence of flow and structural responses that determine the strength of
the energy release of the hydrogen/oxygen mixture formed. If the mixture reaction is primarily a
deflagration, then thermal analyses are required to ascertain the damage to the structure as well
as the environment at the CEV. If the rate of formation and/or confinement leads to a reaction
that transforms with sufficiently rapid energy release to create pressure and/or shock waves, then
a shock code (e.g., CTH) must be employed to track the effects of the blast on the CEV. If timing
of the event is such that the module is already in an escape mode, the thermal and pressure loads
as a function of radial extent must be determined to assess consequences to the vehicle.
7.7 Recommended Methodology/Integrated Analyses
The NESC team describes the integrated analyses paths which constitute a recommended
methodology for the assessment of generic accident scenarios. The overall methodology is
depicted in the flowcharts given below in Figures 7.7-1 through 7.7-4 which serve to guide the
subsequent discussion of the methodology. Consider Figure 7.7-1 which depicts the initial steps
of the proposed analyses. It is necessary to define a suite of credible accident scenarios which
affect the US and specify the initial conditions to be imposed on the US. For purposes of
developing the methodology presented here, we have identified conceptual scenarios that address
a foreseeable range of accident environments to which the US may be subjected. The general
types of accidents are summarized in Section 6.2.1 and include:
• Debris from a solid rocket booster explosion penetrating one or both of the liquid
propellant tanks.
• Debris lost from structures forward of the US penetrating one or both of the liquid
propellant tanks.
• Blast, pressure, or impulse loading sufficient to cause breaching or catastrophic rupture of
one or both liquid propellant tanks.
• Blast, pressure, or impulse loading sufficient to cause internal barrier failure between the
liquid propellant tanks.
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The initial conditions applicable to the US must be determined for each of the general conceptual
accident types. The specific accident scenarios that can result are identified in Section 7.0 as:
1. Perforation of the oxygen tank in the fluid region;
2. Perforation of the of the oxygen tank in the ullage region;
3. Perforation of the hydrogen tank in the fluid region;
4. Perforation of the hydrogen tank in the ullage region; and
5. Tank failure resulting from structural response to a blast or pressure loading.
Prior to the analysis of specific scenarios, it is desirable to validate the simulation strategy to the
extent possible against available experiments that address the mixing and subsequent reactions
involving LO2 and LH2. This activity is noted in Figure 7.7-1 as a supporting analysis linked to
the main flowchart with a dashed line.
There are three main paths of analysis identified in Figure 7.7-1 which depend on whether
penetration of the LO2 tank or LH2 tank occurs or whether failure is the result of a structural
failure cause by pressure, impulse, or blast loading. In the following we summarize the steps in
the analyses required to characterize the responses associated with each of the scenarios.
Scenarios 1 and 2: Perforation of the LO2 tank in the fluid or ullage regions requires the
analysis process depicted in Figure 7.7-2. The external venting process must be simulated to
determine if oxygen merely vents to the exterior region or if the venting process induces
additional structural response. If only venting to the exterior occurs, it may be assumed there are
no adverse effects since there is no contact with the hydrogen confined in the LH2 tank. If it is
determined that the venting process induces a structural response, then a structural analysis is
required to determine if there is a subsequent structural failure that results in contact between the
oxygen and hydrogen, e.g. a failure of the internal common bulkhead which separates LO2 and
LH2, or a failure of containment which results in contact of LO2 and LH2 external to the US.
When there is a structural failure that results in contact between the propellants, the mixing and
phase change processes must be modeled. Simultaneous with the mixing process, it is necessary
to simulate the combustion behavior to determine the ultimate response associated with the
contact of the propellants or the possible contact of LH2 with atmospheric air. These simulations
must span the possibilities from confined internal mixing to mixing external to the US or a
combination of the two. Ultimately, the simulations can require considerations of dynamic
structural response, transient turbulent, two-phase incompressible and compressible CFD, and
reactive chemistry. The end result of the simulation process is a prediction of pressure, impulse,
blast, and thermal environments produced by the envisioned accident scenario. Computational
software available for the required simulations (and those discussed subsequently) is listed in
Table 6.2-1.
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Scenarios 3 and 4: Perforation of the LH2 tank in the fluid or ullage regions requires the
analysis process depicted in Figure 7.7-3. The analysis procedure and required simulations are
the same as those discussed in regard to Scenarios 1 and 2, except in one aspect. The only
difference is that for Scenarios 3 and 4 external mixing of hydrogen with atmospheric air must be
considered when only an external venting occurs. The analysis path for external venting requires
the same steps encountered for any of the mixing processes identified. When external mixing
occurs, aerodynamic effects can be important which require additional considerations regarding
CFD simulation.
Scenario 5: Structural failure caused by pressure, impulse, or blast loading requires the analysis
process depicted in Figure 7.7-4. In this scenario, detailed structural simulations are required to
predict likely failure modes. The propellants can be brought into contact externally or internally,
depending on the mode of structural failure. Mixing and reactive processes can thus occur
between the propellants external or internal to the US. In addition, external mixing and reaction
may occur between LH2 and atmospheric oxygen.
Comment on External Mixing: Although not specifically included as a separate scenario in
Scenarios 1-4, it is possible that LO2 and LH2 tanks are breached externally at essentially the
same time thus leading to the need to consider mixing of the propellants external to the US. This
type mixing has been included as part of Scenario 5. In any proposed scenario, it is reasonable to
determine if there is a possibility for contact of the propellants external to the US. A high degree
of dilution is anticipated for any leakage of propellants into the external environment and results
from the high relative Velocity between the US and the atmosphere and the rapid phase changes
associated with propellant tank blow-down. It seems likely that a simulation, based on a worst
case external mixing scenario, could determine if there is any likelihood of an adverse
environment resulting from external mixing. If it is determined that no adverse environment can
be produced, it may not be necessary to include simulations of external mixing in any of the
other scenarios.
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Figure 7.7-1. Initial Analysis Path
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Figure 7.7-2. Analysis Path for LO2 Tank Failure
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Figure 7.7-3. Analysis Path for LH2 Tank Failure
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8.0 Findings, Observations, and Recommendations
8.1 Findings
There are no findings in this assessment.
8.2 Observations
The methodologies described in this report are based on five scenario pathways. Specifically, the
NESC team considered the following:
Perforation of the oxygen tank in the fluid region;
2. Perforation of the oxygen tank in the ullage region;
3. Perforation of the hydrogen tank in the fluid region;
4. Perforation of the hydrogen tank in the ullage region; and
Tank failure resulting from the structural response to blast loading.
Collectively, the scenarios include external and internal contact between the LH2 and L02
propellants and between LH2 and atmospheric oxygen.
	
0-1	 The design of methodologies for the analysis of accidents involving release of propellants
from the ARES-1 crew launch vehicle requires a detailed knowledge of accident
scenarios including tank rupture, venting, mixing, and reaction behavior.
	
0-2	 In the absence of detailed knowledge of accident scenarios, hypothetical, generic,
accident scenarios must be specified to guide the development of methodologies for the
assessment of accident environments and effects on the CLV.
0-3 The assessment of the environment produced by tank rupture depends on the time
evolution of venting, mixing, and chemical reactions of the propellants. Ultimately, it
must be determined if an explosive or combustible environment can occur and, if so, the
anticipated characteristics of the resulting energy release. Numerical simulations can
provide guidance to assess the physical processes involved in accident scenarios.
0-4 Existing experimental data for L02 and LH2 interactions should be consulted to guide
the development of predictive methodologies for accident analyses. Once specific
analyses techniques have been identified, existing experimental data should be used for
validation.
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8.3 Recommendations
In order to establish a quantitative prediction of physical environments and subsequent vehicle
interactions associated with a potential blast environment resulting from an inadvertent release of
liquid fuel and oxidant from the US of the ARES-1 CLV during ascent, the following are
recommended:
a. Define a suite of credible accident scenarios which affect the US and specify the
initial conditions to be imposed on the US.
b. Prior to the analysis of specific scenarios, validate the simulation strategy to the
extent possible against available experiments that address the mixing and
subsequent reactions involving L02 and LH2.
c. Conduct the accident analysis for each defined scenario, following the appropriate
path of analysis as depicted in figure 7-7.1 through 7-7.4.
9.0 Alternate Viewpoints
There were no alternate viewpoints expressed during this assessment.
10.0 Other Deliverables
There were no other deliverables for this assessment.
11.0 Lessons Learned
There were no lessons learned at this time
12.0 Definitions of Terms
Combustion	 A reactive process between a fuel and an oxidant that undergoes a
sequence of chemical transformations that produces product gases at
high temperature.
Computational Code	 A set of mathematical and logical steps written in a computer language
that translates these rules to electronic instructions in a computer.
Computational Fluid
Dynamics	 A branch of science whereby numerical methods are used to analyze
the effects of fluid dynamics.
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Deflagration	 A subsonic combustion wave that propagates by thermal diffusion
effects and generates relatively low pressure rise.
Detonation	 A supersonic combustion wave that propagates by shock compression
and generates a locally high pressures.
Explosion	 A combustion event that causes a sudden release of energy to produce
a rapid expansion of high temperature gaseous products and
subsequently high pressures and/or shock waves.
Finding
	 A conclusion based on facts established by the investigating authority.
Impulse	 The integral of pressure with respect to time. Impulse is a measure of
the change in momentum imparted by a pressure load.
Lessons Learned	 Knowledge or understanding gained by experience. The experience
may be positive, as in a successful test or mission, or negative, as in a
mishap or failure. A lesson must be significant in that it has real or
assumed impact on operations; valid in that it is factually and
technically correct; and applicable in that it identifies a specific
design, process, or decision that reduces or limits the potential for
failures and mishaps, or reinforces a positive result.
Methodology	 A procedure or set of procedures that includes methods, rules,
postulates and analysis principles followed in assessing a problem of
inquiry.
Observation
	
A factor, event, or circumstance identified during the assessment that
did not contribute to the problem, but if left uncorrected has the
potential to cause a mishap, injury, or increase the severity should a
mishap occur. Alternatively, an observation could be a positive
acknowledgement of a Center/Program/Project/Organization's
operational structure, tools, and/or support provided.
Problem	 The subject of the independent technical assessment/inspection.
Recommendation An action identified by the assessment team to correct a root cause or
deficiency identified during the investigation. The recommendations
may be used by the responsible Center/Program/Project/Organization
in the preparation of a corrective action plan.
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Shock Physics	 Shock physics is the field of study involving the physical and chemical
behavior of materials when subjected to very rapid and large
compressions.
Simulation Software	 A computational code that models a real-life or hypothetical situation
on a computer.
13.0 Acronyms List
CEV Crew Exploration Vehicle
CFD Computational Fluid Dynamics
CLV Crew Launch Vehicle
CM Crew Module
HE High Explosive
JSC Johnson Space Center
LH2 Liquid Hydrogen
L02 Liquid Oxygen
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NESC NASA Engineering and Safety Center
NRB NESC Review Board
SNL Sandia National Laboratories
US Upper Stage
WSTF White Sands Test Facility
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Volume II: Appendix
Appendix A. Proposed Methodology for Analysis of CLV Vulnerability to
Propellant Explosions
Proposed Methodology for Analysis
of CLV Vulnerability to Propellant
Explosions
M. R. Baer, D. A. Crawford, E. S. Hertel ,
C. E. Hickox & M. E. Kipp
Sandia National Laboratories
Albuquerque, New Mexico
January 24, 2008
.. r—	 y^ SandiaIV ^	 Sandia is a multiprogram laboratory operated by Sandia Corporation, a Lockheed Marlin Company, 	 T National
forthe United States Department of Energy under contract DE -AC04- 94AL85000.	 • n • LabOf8E0fiB5
NESC Request No.: NESC 07-029-E
NASA Engineering and Safety Center Document#: Veision:0 Technical Report RP-08-43 1.0
Title: Page #:
Explosion/Blast Dynamics for Constellation Launch 31 of 35
Vehicles Assessment
u 	 and Scope of Work for CLV
• Purpose
— Understand the potential explosion environment produced by a
release of hydrogen from the upper stage
• Scope of Work
— Recommend methodology for quantitatively characterizing the
hydrogen explosion source term
Define the path to characterize consequent blast, thermal, and
debris environments from CLV on the crew exploration vehicle
• ARES-1 configuration and credible accident scenarios to be
provided by NASA
Sandia
National
Laboratories
Overview of Methodology
• Expected sequence of tasks to determine the consequences of
hydrogen release (internal and/or external to stage structure)
Define accident scenarios (NASA)
Initial conditions for blast environment
Pressure / impulse / thermal / debris source terms
FEnvironment at Crew Exploration Vehicle
O
Sandia
IabnfatnlwS
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Define Accident Scenarios (NASA)
• Define potential credible accidents that could release hydrogen
• Examples
— Debris from solid rocket booster explosion breaching exterior
hydrogen tank wall
— Debris lost from structures forward of stage breaching exterior
hydrogen tank wall
— Hydrogen leak internal to walls reacting with atmospheric
oxygen; energy release potential to cause catastrophic rupture
of both hydrogen and oxygen tanks
— Pressure imbalance between hydrogen and oxygen tanks
leading tc barrier failure
• Scenario defined by NASA tasked to illustrate analysis path and
timeline for assessment
— Identify relevant aspects of physics to be addressed
— Identify specific codes and outputs from analysis
O Sandia
.., q ^
	
National
Laboratories
Initial Conditions Leading to a Potential Blast
Environment
• Initial conditions derived from details from accident scenarios
— Location of hydrogen release
— Availability of oxygen (e,g., ambient atmosphere, liquid from
tank)
— Rate and duration of flow, temperature(s) of fuel and
environment (determines mixing conditions and stoichiometry of
combustion event)
— Confinement
— Trajectory location (determines available fuel volumes, vehicle
velocity and ambient environments)
1 Nation
National
Labomtaries
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Pressure I Impulse I Thermal I Debris Source Terms
Initial conditions provide basis for determining source terms (most
likely at selected altitudes)
— Utilize WSTF experimental data to provide additional basis for
combustion / energy release rates
— Recommend a few additional hydrogen / oxygen experiments
more relevant to expected accident conditions— (i.e. breach of
single tanks; influence of propellant spill rates; dynamic
environment effects)
— This is primarily a turbulent flow mixing problem, not a
detonation event
— Use statistical distribution for turbulent combustion with
timescale of partition of energy release supporting blast vs.
waste heat (volumetric combustion behavior)
- Fireball characteristics based on existing correlations to
determine thermal environment
- Pressure/ impulse
- Debris (non-shock event should result in relatively large
fragments at low velocities) D SandaNationallaboratories
ill,0r 	 Environment at Crew Vehicle
• Source term will define near- and far-field effects
— Coupled fluid / structural analyses probably not required and
one-way coupling expected to be adequate
• Separate calculations of the blast and the effects on structures
— Near field. Blast over-pressure / impulse and heat transfer
environment at crew vehicle still attached
(Need to determine if debris can intersect crew vehicle)
— Far field: Blast over-pressure / impulse, heat transfer, and debris
environment at crew vehicle / parachutes
(Launch abort timing relative to explosion critical in order to
determine environment)
fi SdIldido I,,.	 NationaLaboratories
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Codes and Data
• Computational tools
— Computational fluid dynamics /turbulent flow codes to analyze mixing
reaction of hydrogen with on-board oxygen and/or ambient atmosphere
• (FLODU3D or FLUENT to assess fluid mixing of propellants and CTH to
assess release from high pressure reaction products)
— Chemical equilibrium code with nonideal gas capability to define
equation of state and energy release
• CHEETAH to define high pressure product EOS and thermochemistry)
— Shock physics analysis codes to determine blast environment(overpressure and impulse histories) and thermal field of fireball
• (CTH to determine the shock consequences of the blast field; debris
formation and impact dynamics)
— Structural and aerodynamics codes to address response to blast
environment
• (PRESTO structural mechanics analysis; CALORIE thermal analysis;
PREMO aerodynamics analysis)
— Will have to determine fidelity of simulations required (i.e., level of detail
in the models and physics required to have confidence that all the
significant factors / geometry have been included)
Benchmark models / analyses to examples of past accidents
D SandsNationallaboratories
Experimental & Consultation
• Experimental data
- Reanalyze some of the VVSTF LH 2 / L02 data in
relation to this environment (i.e., volume explosion vs.
detonation)
- Additional experiments may prove vital to
understanding this blast environment
• breakup of propellant tanks
• better characterization of mixing conditions
• Consultation
- (i,e, Prof. J. E. Shepherd, Caltech, explosion / blast
expert)
• Laboratory experiments and volumetric explosion expertise
Sandia
,., 9 ,. , fi National
laboratories
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Summary of Methodology
Sequence of tasks to determine consequences of hydrogen release
(internal and/or external to the stage structure)
• Define / assess potential credible accidents that would cause
release of hydrogen and subsequent explosion
• Evaluate / interpret existing experimental data
• Determine initial conditions of fuel release and / or mixing derived
from details of accident scenarios
• Determine energy release / blast effects for scenario of interest
• Blast environment defines near- and far-field pressure/ impulse/
debris effects
• Wide spectrum of computational tools brought to bear on analysis
• Assessment of the potential accident consequence on the crew
exploration vehicle
Sandia
National
Laboratories
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